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November 4, --.

To Mr. ARITA:

I hear that you have at last decided to go to China, and I sincerely congratulate you on this for our country. I hope that you will display utmost activity. I wish to tell you of the ideas I have always had concerning diplomatic problems, which are set down in the separate sheet and I should like to hear your criticism of it after reading. Though I know you have been an advocate for friendship between Japan and U.S.S.R., or at least, opposed to war between these two countries, but we have never had any discussion on this problem. As I do not know whether or not your view has changed since then, I have put down in the separate sheet my view concerning this problem rather in detail.

What I have put down here is a conclusion drawn from my long-cherished view, revised somewhat later, based on both what I had acquired by reading extensively during my two years' stay in SWEDEN and what I had heard from an authority on SOVIET UNION. However, as it was dashed off at a sitting, there may be inconsistent points in my aim. At any rate, my bad style does not fully express my intentions. One of these days, when I see you in SHANGHAI or somewhere, I should like to talk to you about it again.

Though the point of my argument is rather after the fashion of Sentaro UYEDA, it is not necessarily borrowed from him, and, as the saying goes, "a virtuous gentleman admits the truth of other's statement," please kindly read through it without prejudice. Although I have abundant literature on SOVIET RUSSIA, I think that Soviet Russia, Iron Age, and Russian Revolution, written by CHALMERS, an American, are very instructive books. I am sending you a copy of Iron Age and I hope you will read it through.

Yours respectfully,

SHIRATORI

12 November, Showa 10/1935/

Mr. ARITA

(Dear Mr. ARITA,)

Your prompt reply and comments to my humble opinion concerning diplomatic affairs is deeply appreciated. The points you have pointed out in my letter are argumentations not fully clarified or expressions a little too radical. Your opinions are highly appreciated and I will make efforts to continue the study of such affairs.

As to the U.S.S.R. problem, I have had the idea that you and I embraced opposite views but finding now, by your letter, that it is not always so, I am exceedingly pleased. I am looking forward to the opportunity of meeting you and hearing your opinion thoroughly.

Diversion of the mind as you suggested in the last part of your letter is a matter of great consideration for a statesman. In my opinion, although nobody pays any attention today to any domestic policy whatever, which politicians present, if a drastic policy towards the U.S.S.R. is sincerely established, no doubt a certain amount of success can be attained, for the present, in its negotiation with the militarists. I am not without sympathy with those who advocate domestic renovation, but nothing could be expected from the present weak-kneed right wing parties whose ideas are surprisingly shallow and crude. But if a large-scale war breaks out it may be that we will be able to discover a lead in reorganizing a sound nation just as was seen in the almost perfect control established under the liberalist, Lloyd George, in World War I.

With a war in sight, no means should be adopted which will cause an extreme agitation in the economic phase of everyday life. At the same time, during the war, capitalists and ZENJITSU (IN Financial Clique) should submit to great sacrifices. If we could find, therefore, a suitable statesman who could lead the tension of all classes of people to good advantage, an unexpected good result might possibly be produced.

My last letter, having been written only for you without taking any copies, has not been prepared to be shown to others. But you might show my last letter in private to some influential members of the SEIYUKAI Party if you think it advisable, considering the above stated consideration.

One point I would like to add is that if we discuss for or against war with Russia as an abstract argument, there will be various opinions, and perhaps as you say, it is not to be considered as a problem so urgent as I think. It all depends upon the disposition of the militarists in the near future. If the militarist's policy is decided, nothing could prevent it under the present circumstances and if neither diplomats nor political parties could suppress them, why not support their policy and exert our best to carry it out? This is my conclusion.

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Upon my application for permission to return to Tokyo, I have been notified to postpone it at least until owing to the lack of travelling expenses. I have applied again stating that I will pay my own way if need be. Outwardly, I have given family affairs to be the reason but of course, it is not a matter that requires immediate solution. As you have conjectured, it is unbearable for me to merely view the cloudy skies from a remote corner in the present internal and external situation. I know I will be the object of much criticism but I would like to go about and express my views. I will be careful not to cause trouble for the higher officials of our Office; I cannot help if they think it would be better if a parasite like me should stay away -- which may be the reason for not wanting me home.

Sincerely yours,

SHIRATORI

(~~Confidential~~ memorandum found with letter
dated November 12, 1935)

1. I cannot feel but doubt the recent China policy of the Imperial Government as possessing any definite object. The Foreign Office should be aware that the situation prior to the Manchurian Incident had more than proved that mere formality such as "Sino-Japanese Good-Will" has none in value; while on the other hand, the militarists are only focusing their eyes on North China trying to build up a somewhat modified and neutralized Manchukuo. Notwithstanding ulterior speculation, if seen from the standpoint of the Empire itself, the propriety of such policy is undoubtedly most problematic. Intransigently, whether it be Manchuria or the China Proper, they would fall under our Empire's sphere of influence even if left neglected, and it would have been only natural for us to utilize them within the scope of our necessities. The reason why we cannot neglect them was due to the emulation brought about by foreign influences. After all, the Manchurian Incident was no other than an effort aimed to give complete emancipation to the Manchurian-Mongolian territories from foreign influence, and that we should demand that most valid and proper cause in regard to the said incident. Therefore, our future policy towards China should be aimed solely at the exclusion of outer influences, and, excluded of the small profits which we are now confronted with. Each and every of the various projects for China should be directed towards this object and as such things as "Sino-Japanese Good-Will" "Cease in Anti-Japanese Movements," and "Advance into North China" being but mere trifles, the fundamentals must lie in the point of having China cooperate with our Empire's policy aimed at the exclusion of foreign influences.

2. Although, we may mention "exclusion of foreign influences," we, of course, do not mean the exclusion of all foreign activities in order to acquire monopolistic positions. For instance, I believe that due respects should be given to the various British, American and other legal establishments in China, and moreover, we should be so prepared as to give them willing cooperation. By excluding foreign influences from China, we do not mean to be the so-called "dog in the manger," but only in the expulsion of all influences which are harmful to China, and accordingly to Japan. Although we may say that this shall be applicable to all, regardless of what that country may be, when we take a general view, we find that the movements of the various countries in China to-day is void of that former vestige when each country had her own sphere of influences. Few still cling to the relics of the former age and, in general, they could be said to be unarmful. If Japan takes the initiative, for instance, in discarding the rights of extraterritoriality and other special rights which are perfunctory; and of having the foreign settlement removed, and foreign advisors reduced; wouldn't others be, as a whole, possible?

3. It is needless to say that, among the foreign influences that should be most expelled, is that of Red Russia. This is a question which our Empire's diplomacy must concentrate its main force in the future, and that Sino-Japanese concert must be a solution to this problem also, together with our cooperation

with the Anglo-Americans. The reason why I take interest in the European political situation is because there is the problem related to the Soviets. There are some in Japan who are being deceived by the so-called "peace policy" of Soviet Russia; who ignore the red movement in China; who are satisfied with the obedient withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Manchukuo; and who advocate that Russo-Japanese good-will should be made a principle. Moreover, there are some who maintain the recent military power of Soviet Russia as something that should not be under-rated and, harbouring fear, point out the disadvantage of clashing against Russia. This is what displeases me most. It is true that Russia wants peace at present, but there will be no folly so great as this as to judge her being turned substantially into a peaceful country. For what purpose was that five-year plan made? What are the heavy industry and the chemical industry for? And for what are the huge armament preparations for? They say they fear foreign invasion. It's nothing but a hackneyed expression used by a militaristic country. The mighty always try to use this expression. Still more, when we consider the rising generation of present-day Russia burning with a kind of fervent religious order for an ideology; that is, they feel it an honor when they can enjoin in a crusade against the so-called "Capitalism" and "Imperialism"! People may say that Lenin's ideology of world revolution is no longer upheld. In fact, when we consider the ways in which they handle their matters, they seem to be satisfied with the "one nation socialism," but there is no proof to prove that STALIN himself recognized the abrogation of his dream of world proletarian revolution which he once firmly embraced. The point is that they know their deficiency in power to carry this out. It is because they have been disappointed to find that Germany and Italy, which they tied most of their hopes on, have only learned its ways whereby the contents took opposite courses.

We know that their inner desire is no other than to see Communistic revolutions break out everywhere when repetition of damages caused by another world war flare up again. The fact that Soviet Russia, a novice, should incessantly advocate the principle of "mediation by the League of Nations" in the Italo-Ethiopian controversy is because that she desires the downfall of MUSSOLINI and hope that once again Communism will over-run the Iberian Peninsula. It is a generally agreed opinion among the intelligentsia that the economic and social conditions of Western European countries are different from those of Russia, and that it is impossible to expect communistic achievements such as those seen in Russia. The leaders of Russia may have already realized this and may have given up the plan to bolshevize Europe. Nevertheless, the 400 million people of China and the 300 million people of India have become to-day their most aimed object, and the ignorance and remoteness of the economic conditions of these people resemble closely to those of Russia, which prior to the revolution was extremely inferior. It is often said that to-day, the only place on this earth that has possibilities of giving occurrence to communistic revolution are China and India. Although, I do not necessarily believe in this, the Soviet Government today does believe in this, and there is no doubt that they are now engaged in the various manipulations. Now, for instance, let us say Russia conceded to back up a hundred steps and gave up once and for all her dream of world bolshevization.

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In that case, Soviet Russia will gradually turn into a capitalistic country, and into an absolute imperialistic state as in the time of the Czar, which her present tendency clearly indicates. If not the former, then the latter. And if there is absolutely no possibility for Russia, under the present Regime, to become a democratic country with peace as its principle; then it would make no difference to the fact that Russia will remain to be a troublesome neighbour of Japan. Should we remain idly by and just let her with our hands locked, she would polish her claws and teeth all the more. The situation will become such that we have to choose one of the two; either submit ourselves to bolshevization or, if not, to expose ourselves to her armed invasion. I could never agree to the policy of binding ourselves with Russia and await her to replete her powers and expanding her materialistic wings.

4. Looking at the present day power of Soviet Russia as from the standpoint of figures, it does seem to be most imposing; but, as the days are still shallow since the revolution and the dissatisfied elements still infest the countryside and shortages are still acute in implements and machineries; resources and materials, and manpower, it is clear that she will immediately sustain internal collapse once she fights against some great power. This is the unanimous opinion of those who are familiar with the actual situation. That is most desirable for Soviet Russia at present, is to have peaceful and amicable relationships with the foreign powers. Therefore, countries which border Soviet Russia and who have any pending affairs that need be settled sooner or later with her, should never idle away this opportune time of today. At present there is no country on this earth except Russia that can become a real menace to Japan. Although it seems that forgetful Japanese people do not look back to the days in the latter stages of the Shogunate era when our northern borders were invaded and plundered, and look at the dangerous stages experienced during the Russo-Japanese War, as far away dreams of the past. But, beware, those who forget the teaching of history and lack far-sighted prudence will suffer troubles in the near future. Fate have that the Slavs and the Yamato race must eventually fight each other for supremacy on the Asiatic continent. The question is not of the temporary change to be made in the state of affairs or the form of government in Soviet Russia. Thus taking a far-sighted view, I believe that adoption of a policy for an instantaneous removal of future calamity at this stage when they are comparatively impotent is a fact which should never be neglected by those who bear concern for the welfare of the people and nation. I am not saying that we should unreasonably force a war against Soviet Russia now. I am only saying that we should start negotiations with her with resolutions, not refusing war if it is inevitable, to shut her out completely from advancing into East Asia.

Firstly, Russia should give up entirely her activities of Bolshevization in East Asia; abolish military armaments in VLADIVOSTOCK, etc.; complete withdrawal of her troops from OUTER MONGOLIA and HSINCHILANG, not stationing a single soldier in the area of LAKE BAIKAL; -- these shall be our minimum demands, and others, not to speak of the problems relative to fishing and the rights and interests regarding forestry. Problems regarding transfer of the northern half of SACHALIN at moderate prices are also included. In the

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future, purchase of the MARTIME PROVINCE OF SIBERIA must also be considered. These demands should be made with firm determination. There would be no possibility of success if we negotiate with such a generous attitude as was done at the negotiation on the purchase of the North Manchuria Railway.

5. Now that we have already made up our determination of not refusing war if inevitable, diplomatic measures relative to this should be treated as early as possible. Since the relationship of Germany and Poland with Russia are in a same position as ours, there is no need for us to try and specifically weave understanding with them. Once the war breaks out they will surely rise on our side. The only trouble is England. As for America, she has not even reached an understanding with England and we can control her to a certain degree. Especially, in America the present regime will be re-elected in the next term, and it could be seen that its non-intervention policy shall be maintained, at least, for the next five years. Aside from this, there is no need to give much consideration. Then how can we reach an understanding with England? This will be the most urgent question. The first step is to open a way for an understanding on problems in regard to China. For this purpose, we, of course, must slacken the pace of our China policy but, as Britain shall fully recognize Japan's position in East Asia, we need not make much concessions. The fact is that this has been what Britain desired while we, on the contrary, have been rather reluctant on the question until now. Therefore, as far as it concerns China, I believe the problem is soluble. Only that although I desire to see such Anglo-Japanese alliance of the former years be formed against Russia now, the current situation will not allow it. As for us today, we do not find it necessary. It will be sufficient if we only had their spiritual aid. Now, there is question of INDIA and the CENTRAL ASIA; her primary dislike for communists; and especially while there are four to five years of domination by the conservative party, it seems most favourable for England in this regard. The only fact that is unfavourable for us is that the League of Nations still exists and Soviet Russia is one of her members. The decline of the League of Nations is most desirous. Although it would be a most advantageous development for us if England goes back to her old policy of isolation, and come closer in relation with Germany, it would not necessarily be an absolute requisite.

If JAPAN should be in a position to invade SOVIET RUSSIA in co-operation with GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN will not remain a passive spectator. But from the outset we have abandoned territorial ambitions and furthermore, since GERMANY acknowledges the status quo of the western border and has been deprived of her colonies, GREAT BRITAIN may not be too unwilling to recognize GERMANY's eastward expansion at the expense of RUSSIA. Which ever way, I do not discern much opposition from GREAT BRITAIN in our policy to SOVIET RUSSIA. The diplomacy of the Empire must exert its efforts on this point.

6. The aim of our policy toward CHINA is self-evident from the explanation stated above. The nucleus exists in a Sino-Japanese Alliance and an anti-Soviet Russia policy. JAPAN should cooperate with CHINA in having the absolute sovereignty of INNER and OUTER MONGOLIA restored, cooperate in subjugating Communist rebels, cooperate in reorganizing and strengthening the Chinese armed forces. These are within the bounds of JAPAN-GREAT BRITAIN cooperation in CHINA. Other problems are minor details and trivialities of everyday occurrence. Furthermore, since the said policy does not infringe on any existing treaties, not only will it be free from criticism viewed from international morals but a Sino-Japanese Alliance formed to confront Communism, which is the enemy of a great number of peoples in the world today, would not only draw sympathy from world opinion but even the United States would understand the sincerity of JAPAN towards CHINA and there will be a great change of general opinion as regards the Manchurian Incident. In brief, success would depend on the method of execution and preparation.

In my opinion, the atmosphere is growing tense day by day within army circles that a war with Soviet Russia sooner or later is unavoidable. The frequent troubles on the Russo-Manchurian border and various movements against OUTER MONGOLIA proves this.

If our Foreign Office considers that it can patch up affairs by makeshift means of buying up the Eastern China Railway and establishing a border committee, it is evident that we shall again encounter the bitter experience such as the Manchurian Incident. This time our opponent is great RUSSIA although she may be withered and torn. If war with RUSSIA is unavoidable, the whole nation must unite to support it.

Especially in diplomatic circles, we must be fully prepared. Under the hand-to-mouth existence of the weak-kneed cabinet, the militarists and Foreign Office are acting arbitrarily. With complication and disorder in our internal renovation movement today, what would be the outcome if a large-scaled LIU CHOU-

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KO Incident suddenly exploded. It is hoped that the Imperial Army of today would not be uncontrollable as such and at least when RUSSIA is concerned, they would not execute their plans unless the whole army is in entire accord.

Judging from a far-sighted national policy and making reference to the present international situation, if the general opinion considers that to settle the issue with RUSSIA would be most profitable, the Army and Foreign Office should at least act in harmonious cooperation. If the Foreign Office considers a peace policy toward RUSSIA would be most profitable for the country, the Foreign Office should clarify its attitude and lead the people with dignity and make provisions for a peaceful solution. Without this faith and without this courage, being afraid of the imperious militarists and letting matters take the course of least resistance is being most unloyal to our country.

Generally speaking, the diplomacy of a country must have a fundamental policy. The so-called conciliatory diplomacy was welcomed as a temporary measure in our country after the tempest of the Manchurian Incident, but upon reconsideration it was merely a slogan having no particular contents. To conciliate without selecting the opponent or offerings is like a prostitute. An upright gentleman always selects his company. A nation with a firm belief and a mission will always have friends and also enemies. Vague pacificism and internationalism without a definite object will not pass anywhere today.

It was our Empire's diplomacy before the Incident to accept seriously the momentary empty prayers of the European nations which had fully experienced the disaster and hardship of World War I and have heretofore honestly practiced them.

The HIROTA diplomacy is surely not going to revive the insensible and faithless policy of former times. But judging from the past results, only the passive phase has been applied as in conciliation with all countries, Sino-Japanese amity, and as in purchasing of the North China Railway. The denouncement of the Washington Treaty too is within the category of passive diplomacy. At least, it cannot be deemed as being a positive diplomacy. One cannot help but entertain doubt as to the objective of Japanese diplomacy by the present Foreign Office.

Conciliation is merely a means of diplomacy and is merely technical. If it is a principle, it must be thorough. Have they enough courage to return MANCHURIA to CHINA, to get reinstated in the League of Nations and to apologize to the world for the crime? Although the popular newspapers in JAPAN

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write about conciliation with the nations of the world and applaud it, why is it that there is no response abroad? Is it merely an abstract idea? It is because empty talks without substantial contents only deceive the practical western people. Even the good-natured Japanese populace will not long be satisfied. They must first understand the objectives themselves.

Discarding all abstract terms and using clear terms so that everybody can understand what the Imperial diplomacy wants and what it is going to do should be clarified. Japanese people will not be lost as to which course to take and foreign powers will clarify their attitude. It cannot be denied that the uneasiness in JAPAN at present is due to economic and social causes but the chief reason is ambiguity and uncertainty of the foreign relations. I believe it is of the utmost necessity today to clarify the foreign policy in order to settle the trend of public opinion and to sweep away the uneasiness of the people. The internal and foreign situation does not permit a day of ease. The deep reconsideration of the men who guide the national foreign policy is required.

7. (In short, at this time I keenly feel the necessity of the cabinet decision regarding the great object of the Empire's diplomacy. I believe this object to be a drastic liquidation of relations with SOVIET RUSSIA. All diplomatic activities should be concentrated on this object. I believe that the CHINA problem and the disarmament problem are secondary considerations compared to this great object. The reformation of various internal affairs should also be limited within this phase and in line with Item 1. With this great problem in mind, internal and foreign relations should be adjusted for the time being and the trend of public opinion can be settled and the uneasiness can be swept away. Moreover, it is necessary that the liquidation of relations with SOVIET RUSSIA be thoroughgoing in order to sweep away the uneasiness not only for the present but to be rid of the fears and worries from the northwest forever. Therefore, it is natural that war may be unavoidable. It is needless to say that a diplomat should not talk rashly about such matters but I believe that if we miss this opportunity today, we will never have another opportunity to oust the Slav peril forever.) If we execute this today, I firmly believe that we can accomplish it thoroughly with minimum sacrifice and with least fear of interference by third parties.

First, if SOVIET RUSSIA advances at the present pace, it will not take ten years before she will become a very powerful country which we will not be able to touch.) Even before the revolution a remarkable development of industry in RUSSIA was gradually taking place. Today, by using forced labor and ignorin

profit, and possessing inexhaustible resources and continuing mass production, so far as quantity is concerned, no other power is able to keep pace with her.

(Second, her weakness is said to lie in the manpower requisites, but Russians before the revolution have gradually died out and have been replaced by those blind (Russians who have been inspired with communism from the kindergartens and do not know the existence of any other civilization. As time goes by, she will become so powerful in manpower also that we will not be able to overtake her.

Third, in order to eliminate the menace of RUSSIA forever, it is necessary to make her a powerless capitalistic republic and to rigidly control her natural resources. However, when the foundation of the Communist Government becomes firm, the anti-revolution movement will not easily succeed even if she should be defeated in a war with a foreign country. At present, the chances are good.)

Fourth, in various countries, the enraged feelings against the cruel and atrocious communist revolution are still ardent. The capitalistic force of America and Europe is still strong and it is most advantageous to settle the issue now when the anti-communism force is strong.

Fifth, (the international position of SOVIET RUSSIA is not firm yet. GERMANY and POLAND are burning with aspirations for UKRAINE etc. I believe that the present time, when BRITAIN, FRANCE, etc., do not desire armed interference because of not having fully recovered from the effects of the World War, is the most opportune moment.) Especially we must not miss the present opportunity when FRANCE has no close relation with SOVIET RUSSIA as at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and has neither intention nor ability to give financial assistance to her.

Sixth, we must anticipate that at least a half or one year will elapse before hostilities with Soviet Russia will break out. At the present world situation, during that period, she cannot make ample preparations for lack of financial credit and lack of exchangeable goods. On the other hand, we can make adequate preparations. This is the reason why I consider that this moment of world depression is the most opportune moment. There are many other reasons. However, we too cannot endure too great a sacrifice. However, if our highly trained army marches against the disorderly mob of revolutionist army, it is not difficult to predict the general outcome of the war. Internal disintegration cannot be avoided and I believe we may not have to exert much effort.

profit, and possessing inexhaustible resources and continuing mass production, so far as quantity is concerned, no other power is able to keep pace with her.

(Second, her weakness is said to lie in the manpower requisites, but Russians before the revolution have gradually died out and have been replaced by those blind (Russians who have been inspired with communism from the kindergartens and do not know the existence of any other civilization. As time goes by, she will become so powerful in manpower also that we will not be able to overtake her.

Third, in order to eliminate the menace of RUSSIA forever, it is necessary to make her a powerless capitalistic republic and to rigidly control her natural resources. However, when the foundation of the Communist Government becomes firm, the anti-revolution movement will not easily succeed even if she should be defeated in a war with a foreign country. At present, the chances are good.)

Fourth, in various countries, the enraged feelings against the cruel and atrocious communist revolution are still ardent. The capitalistic force of America and Europe is still strong and it is most advantageous to settle the issue now when the anti-communism force is strong.

Fifth, (the international position of SOVIET RUSSIA is not firm yet. GERMANY and POLAND are burning with aspirations for UKRAINE etc. I believe that the present time, when BRITAIN, FRANCE, etc., do not desire armed interference because of not having fully recovered from the effects of the World War, is the most opportune moment.) Especially we must not miss the present opportunity when FRANCE has no close relation with SOVIET RUSSIA as at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and has neither intention nor ability to give financial assistance to her.

Sixth, we must anticipate that at least a half or one year will elapse before hostilities with Soviet Russia will break out. At the present world situation, during that period, she cannot make ample preparations for lack of financial credit and lack of exchangeable goods. On the other hand, we can make adequate preparations. This is the reason why I consider that this moment of world depression is the most opportune moment. There are many other reasons. However, we too cannot endure too great a sacrifice. However, if our highly trained army marches against the disorderly mob of revolutionist army, it is not difficult to predict the general outcome of the war. Internal disintegration cannot be avoided and I believe we may not have to exert much effort.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard F. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the attached document, IPS No. 2419, was obtained by me from the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17 day of Sept. 1946.

/s/ Richard F. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Wm. C. Prout

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity